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What We Have Here Is a Failure to Communicate: Using a Model to Explain 
Textbook Representations of Human Evolutionary Theory
Abstract
In this paper we develop a general model 
to explain the hostility toward, and igno-
rance of, human evolutionary theory (ET) 
in the social sciences. We first provide 
relevant theoretical background explain-
ing the basics of ET. We then briefly 
describe the history of, and reasons for, 
social science attacks against ET. After 
providing this background, we turn to 
our study of social science textbooks, 
describe the logic of our model, and 
specify four explicit predictions derived 
from it. Finally, we present the results of 
our study and discuss the significance of 
our findings.
I.1 Theoretical Overview of Human 
Evolutionary Theory
 Human evolutionary theory (used here 
interchangeably with ET1) is a theoretical 
approach to the entire field of human sci-
ence motivated by the desire to illumi-
nate human behavior by subjecting it to 
evolutionary analysis (Barkow, Cos-
mides, & Tooby, 1992; Buss 1995; Tooby 
& Cosmides, 2005).  More specifically, 
it approaches human nature from an 
adaptationist perspective, attempting 
to discern the specific adaptations that 
underlie and give rise to human behav-
ior—especially social behavior (e.g., 
mating behavior, cooperation, coalitional 
behavior, family dynamics, etc.) (Sand-
erson, 2001). Although often seen as 
contentious or controversial (see section 
II below; see also Rose and Rose, 2000), 
its ability to elucidate human behavior 
follows from two simple and uncontro-
versial facts: 1) Evolution explains the 
nature of the biological world, and 2) 
Humans are biological creatures (Atran, 
2005). If these premises are accepted—
and most social scientists do accept 
them—ET should appear a natural, inevi-
table, and fruitful approach to the study 
of human behavior. In fact, ET provides 
a productive metatheory for the social 
sciences, unlike other popular theoreti-
cal perspectives such as rational choice 
theory, which assumes that individuals 
choose the ‘best’ action according to 
stable preferences with well-defined con-
straints (Simon, 1955; Ketelaar & Ellis, 
2000; Kanazawa, 2001). Because of its 
insistence on viewing humans as evolved 
organisms, ET asserts that an under-
standing of natural selection and sexual 
selection is essential for a comprehensive 
understanding of human behavior (Mayr, 
1985; Buss, 1995; Tooby and Cosmides, 
2005).
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1 There are several theoretical perspectives that apply evolutionary theory to human social behavior, including socio-
biology, dual inheritance theory, behavioral ecology, and evolutionary psychology (see Smith, 2000), all with slightly 
different assumptions and methods, yet all similar at core. For simplicity, we use the umbrella term ET.
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I.2 Natural and Sexual Selection
 Darwin’s theories of natural selec-
tion and sexual selection are essential to 
understanding ET. Darwin was not the 
first thinker to propose that life evolves; 
rather, he was the first thinker to pro-
pose a plausible mechanism2 explain-
ing why and how life evolves (Darwin 
1859/1958). His proposal can be reduced 
to three principles: 1) Organisms vary in 
their ability to reproduce. Some chee-
tahs, for example, run faster than others 
and consequently can procure more 
resources; ceteris paribus, such cheetahs 
will survive longer and are likely to have 
greater reproductive success. 2) Organ-
isms inherit traits from their parents. 
Fast cheetahs pass their running ability 
to their offspring. 3) More organisms 
are born than survive. Organisms that 
inherit traits that allow them to more ef-
fectively interact with their environment 
are more likely to survive long enough 
to reproduce. The faster cheetahs, for 
example, because they are better at ob-
taining important resources, will survive 
and pass on their traits.  The statistical 
result of this process is a pool of “fitter” 
organisms (see Alcock, 2005, for many 
specific empirical examples).
 A useful distinction can be made be-
tween natural selection proper and sexual 
selection. According to Darwin (1871), 
organisms not only compete for environ-
mental resources, they also compete to 
attract and acquire mates. This process is 
termed sexual selection and leads to two 
different types of attributes: 1) attributes 
that enhance an organism’s ability to 
compete with members of its own sex for 
access to mates, and 2) attributes that at-
tract the opposite sex (Andersson, 1994; 
Andersson & Iwasa, 1996). The first type 
of attribute is illustrated by the disparity 
in size between male and female elephant 
seals. Male elephant seals are an aver-
age of three times larger than females 
because they have a long evolutionary 
history of competing with each other for 
access to females (Le Boeuf, 1974). The 
second type of attribute is illustrated by 
the peacock’s elaborate train. Although 
the train appears to have no direct surviv-
al function, it serves to attract peahens; 
therefore, on average, peacocks with 
large, colorful trains leave more offspring 
than do those with less elaborate trains 
(Petrie & Halliday, 1994).  
 Darwin’s theories established a 
scientific paradigm for biology, and like 
all paradigms, it has been continually 
refined. For example, Hamilton’s (1964) 
theory of inclusive fitness shifted the 
focus of biologists from individuals and 
their direct reproductive success to genes 
and their differential replication (Grif-
fin & West, 2002). Since genes are the 
real unit of natural selection, Hamilton 
argued that biologists needed to pay at-
tention to inclusive fitness rather than di-
rect fitness.  If, for example, genes in one 
organism gave rise to the ability to detect 
shared genes in another—a brother or 
sister, son or daughter, cousin or nephew, 
for example—and also to the propensity 
to help those genes replicate (under the 
right circumstances)3, those genes (be-
cause of their phenotypic effects) would 
be selected for. The theory of inclusive 
fitness allowed biologists to explain 
many otherwise puzzling phenomena. To 
take a familiar example, humans are of-
ten willing to make enormous sacrifices 
for relatives, sacrifices they would not 
make for strangers or even for friends. 
Given this reality, it is not surprising that 
kin terms are universal (Brown, 2004) 
and are capable of provoking intense 
emotions (for a readable account of at-
tempts to explain altruism biologically, 
see Dugatkin, 2006). 
I.3 Roots of Sociobiology
 Hamilton’s inclusive fitness theory 
was vitally important because it set 
the stage for the gene-centered view of 
evolution, a view that was clarified in the 
sixties and seventies by Williams (1966) 
and Dawkins (1976), among others, and 
provided the theoretical underpinning of 
modern ET. Also important to ET was 
the socially oriented biological think-
ing of Wilson (1975/2000) and Trivers 
(1971; 1972). Especially relevant are two 
theories developed by Trivers: reciprocal 
altruism and parental investment.
 Reciprocal altruism consists of 
delayed but mutual acts of benefaction 
between organisms (Trivers, 1971). For 
example, if an animal shares food with 
another at time x and receives food back 
at time y, both animals may benefit. 
Although reciprocal altruism has been 
reported in animals as diverse as vampire 
bats (Wilkinson, 1984) and stickleback 
fish (Milinski, Pfluger, Külling, & Ket-
tler, 1990), primates provide the best 
documented cases. Primates preferential-
ly groom individuals who groom them; 
they preferentially support those who 
support them (Schino, 2007). Reciprocal 
altruism is important because it allows 
for the evolution of greater cooperation 
among non-related organisms, a kind of 
cooperation that is especially prevalent 
among humans (Barber, 2004; Lehman 
& Keller, 2006).
 Parental investment explains the 
diversity of mating strategies in nature 
(see also Clutton-Brock, 1991; Dunbar, 
1995). Because of its complexities, the 
theory cannot be properly explicated 
here; however, one important facet of 
it—an argument that goes back to Dar-
win (1871)—should be noted.  Darwin 
argued that when choosing mates the 
sex that invests more in its offspring will 
be more discriminating. By definition, 
females produce larger gametes which 
require higher initial investment than 
do male gametes. This difference leads 
to adaptive strategies of high relative 
mating effort in males and high relative 
parental effort in females (Low, 2000). In 
many animal species, males invest enor-
mous amounts of energy attempting to 
attract and procure mates—the elaborate 
bower of the bower bird, the huge train 
of the peacock—while females invest 
vast amounts of energy in birthing and 
caring for their offspring. In some cases, 
2 It is important to remember that the theory of evolution by natural selection was co-discovered by Charles Darwin 
and Alfred Russel Wallace. However, Darwin took the theory further and discovered the principles of sexual selection 
(Larson, 2004).
3 Hamilton’s rule for these conditions can be stated more formally: C < R x B. Where C is the cost in fitness to the ac-
tor, R is the coefficient of relatedness between the actor and the recipient, and B is the benefit in fitness to the recipi-
ent.
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in fact, the male’s investment ends at 
copulation (Møller & Thornhill, 1998). 
Although humans show a large degree of 
biparental care, there is still a significant 
sex difference in parental investment. 
More importantly, there is a significant 
sex difference in the minimum possible 
parental investment. Women always bear 
the risks of pregnancy and the exorbi-
tant energetic costs of bringing a fetus 
to term (Symons, 1979). Due to these 
sex differences, women are predicted 
to be choosier about whom they mate 
with than men, a prediction that has been 
amply demonstrated (Clark & Hatfield, 
1989; Schmitt et al., 2003; McBurney, 
Zapp, & Streeter, 2005).
I.4 What Is an Adaptation?
 Although nearly impossible to offer 
an exact, noncontroversial definition of 
adaptation, it is not difficult to forward a 
useful, working definition. An adaptation 
is an inherited attribute that developed 
through the processes of natural or sexual 
selection because it helped an organ-
ism interact more effectively with the 
environment and with other organisms, 
including conspecifics (Williams, 1966; 
Buss, Haselton, Shackelford, Bleske, & 
Wakefield, 1998). Some adaptations are 
quite clear and easy to discern. Take, for 
example, the cheetah’s running ability. 
Cheetahs’ bodies have been carefully 
refined by millions of years of natural 
selection to support and produce bouts 
of incredible running speed (Taylor & 
Rowntree, 1973). Other adaptations are 
more difficult to demonstrate. This is 
often the case when considering possible 
psychological adaptations. In these cases, 
it is important to collect a wide variety of 
evidence from multiple sources to reach 
convergent conclusions. It is also neces-
sary to test plausible counterhypotheses.
 To illustrate, consider the case of 
men’s age preference for potential mates, 
which is sometimes considered a product 
of socialization (Eagly & Wood, 1999). 
Using evolutionary logic, it is plausible 
to hypothesize that men will find women 
who have high reproductive value (ages 
circa 18-30) more attractive than other 
women (those outside of the age group). 
To establish the validity of this hypoth-
esis, ETs use convergent data (Schmitt 
& Pilcher, 2004). For example, data 
from Western societies demonstrates 
that adolescent men prefer substantially 
older women as dating partners (Ken-
rick, Keefe, Gabrielidis, & Cornelius, 
1996), while cross-cultural self-report, 
questionnaire, personal advertisement, 
and marriage license data indicate that 
older men prefer substantially younger 
women (Buss, 1989; Kenrick & Keefe, 
1992). Ethnographic evidence from the 
Hadza—a hunter-gatherer society from 
Tanzania—also supports the hypothesis: 
Hadza men prefer young, fertile women 
(Marlowe, 1998, 2004). Taken together, 
the evidence shows that men do not sim-
ply prefer younger women; they prefer 
women in a specific age range. This data 
is difficult to account for from a socio-
cultural perspective because it shows that 
men’s preferences are age-specific and 
exist in societies untouched by Western 
media. Convergent data, therefore, allow 
ETs to falsify plausible counterhypoth-
eses (the sociocultural hypothesis, for 
example), thus providing firmer support 
for their own (the age-specific adaptation 
hypothesis). 
I.5 Adaptationism
 According to ET, human behavior is 
most profitably studied from an adapta-
tionist perspective (Tooby & Cosmides, 
2005). Adaptationism is a heuristic that 
involves looking at physiological and 
psychological mechanisms and asking 
what their function or purpose is (Resnik, 
1997). For example, most pregnant 
women worldwide suffer from morning 
sickness. The adaptationist perspective 
assumes that a universal, costly phenom-
enon such as this serves a purpose (i.e., 
aids in survival and/or reproduction). 
Although there is no universal agreement 
on the root cause of morning sickness, 
the adaptationist perspective has generat-
ed plausible hypotheses that are currently 
being tested. A leading candidate is that 
morning sickness protects the developing 
embryo from harmful toxins and micro-
organisms (Flaxman & Sherman, 2000, 
2008). As adumbrated above, adaptation-
ist hypotheses are subjected to rigorous 
testing before achieving provisional ac-
ceptance. This perspective has been criti-
cized (see, for example, Gould, 1997), 
but it follows logically from two facts: 
1) Natural selection is the only known 
process that creates biological order 
and function, and 2) All behavioral and 
cognitive processes point toward orga-
nized substrates or mechanisms, whether 
physiological or psychological, that play 
an important role in the explanation of 
human behavior. Even Skinner’s brand 
of behaviorism implied the existence 
of adaptations for operant condition-
ing (Skinner, 1974; Buss, 1995), some 
perhaps quite complicated. This does not 
mean that every particular behavior is an 
adaptation in itself (Atran, 2005). There 
is, for example, no adaptation for being a 
fan of the Los Angeles Lakers. Or, even 
more extreme, there is no adaptation for 
being disgusted by spider x at time y. It is 
probable, on the other hand, that there is 
a general adaptation for fearing or being 
disgusted by spiders (Buss, 1995; Vernon 
& Berenbaum, 2002), and that there 
are adaptations for coalitional reason-
ing, which are co-opted by team sports 
(Wrangham, 1999; Kurzban, Tooby, & 
Cosmides, 2001; Wagner, Flynn, & Eng-
land, 2002; Winegard & Deaner, 2008). 
Adaptationism has proved to be a power-
ful tool in analyzing human behavior and 
is integral to the program of ET. 
I.6 Ultimate and Proximate Explana-
tions
 ETs study and analyze behavior from 
a number of different explanatory levels 
(Tinbergen, 1963; Goetz & Shackelford, 
2006). Two of the most fruitful are the 
proximate and the ultimate (distal). 
The ultimate level addresses a trait or 
behavior’s evolutionary function, the 
proximate the physiological (or psycho-
logical) makeup of the particular trait or 
behavioral mechanism (see figure 1). To 
consider in more detail, take the example 
of male status-seeking behavior. There 
are a variety of ways to explain such 
behavior from the proximate level: Status 
and recognition give pleasure; status and 
recognition give power; status and recog-
nition give access to enjoyable activities. 
These proximate explanations are all 
true, but from the ultimate perspective, 
status-seeking behavior exists because it 
has a long evolutionary history of trans-
lating into reproductive success (Boone, 
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1986; Chagnon, 1988; Strassman, 1997; 
Zerjal et al., 2003; for non-human 
animals, see Ellis, 1995). It is especially 
important to keep this distinction in mind 
when analyzing humans because there is 
a tendency to conflate ultimate evolution-
ary causes with proximate psychologi-
cal mechanisms.  This leads to strange 
claims about human motivation that are 
palpably at odds with empirical evidence, 
such as that every thing a man does, he 
does for sexual purposes (Buller, 1999; 
for an egregious example of this confu-
sion, see Kanazawa, 2007). While this 
statement may have some validity from 
the ultimate level of explanation, it is pa-
tently absurd from the proximate. Mozart 
wrote music because he had a passion to 
do so, not because he desired sex.  
Fig. 1. The ultimate level refers to the selection 
pressures in the past which led to certain traits or 
behaviors in organisms. The proximate level refers 
to the psychological/physiological mechanisms that 
produce the behavior in a specific environment at a 
specific time. Proximate mechanisms are influenced 
by various factors such as the environment, cogni-
tion, etc. Thus, behavior can be explained from 
either level without conflict. See text.
I.7 Not All Adaptations Are Currently 
Adaptive
 Because biological evolution occurs 
relatively slowly, environmental changes 
can outpace genetic ones. This fact is 
especially important when considering 
humans because of our ability to rapidly 
alter our environment. Our minds were 
not designed to solve the problems of 
living in a heavily populated, technologi-
cal society. For example, even though 
the risk of being killed by an automobile 
considerably outweighs that of being 
killed by a snake (41,611 deaths from 
motor vehicle accidents in USA in 1999, 
versus 10-15 per year from snake bites) 
(National Transportation Safety Board 
[NTSB], 1999; McNamee, 2001), fear 
of snakes is a common human phobia, 
while fear of automobiles is not.  Or 
consider our propensity to eat foods high 
in sugars, fats, and salts (see figure 2 
below). Before the creation of supermar-
kets and fast food restaurants, ripe fruits 
and meat from hunted animals provided 
our ancestors’ with energy-rich, meta-
bolically efficient foods.  Because these 
foods once required considerable effort 
to acquire, natural selection favored neu-
ral systems that rewarded the pursuit and 
consumption of them (Gerber, Williams, 
& Gray, 1999). In most modern societies, 
these foods no longer require effort to 
obtain. Yet our taste preferences remain 
and are further exploited by the calcu-
lated refinement of various food
products, creating an array of tasty 
snacks (e.g., candy bars, ice cream, 
potato chips) that tap into our ancestral 
proclivities. For these reasons, many 
ETs believe that a search for psychologi-
cal adaptations should begin with our 
purported “environment of evolutionary 
adaptedness” (EEA). This is the environ-
ment that our ancestors spent the major-
ity of their existence in; consequently, 
many current psychological adaptations 
were shaped by forces that prevailed in 
the EEA (Barkow et al., 1992; but see 
Smith, 2000; 2001). It is important to 
understand that the EEA is not a con-
crete place in time, but rather a statistical 
composite of selection pressures affect-
ing a species in its ancestral past.  ETs 
do not believe that one could travel back 
in time, as it were, and land in the EEA. 
Whether or not a strong version of the 
EEA hypothesis turns out to be true, 
a plethora of evidence indicates that a 
weaker version will remain necessary 
to fully understand human behavior (for 
further discussion, see Crawford, 2000).     
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Fig. 2. Model depicting the interactive relationship 
between preexisting adaptations and the modern 
environment. In this example, the pressure was 
procuring proper nutrients. This pressure led to a 
neural reward system for seeking and consuming 
sugars, salts, and fats. The dashed line represents a 
break between our ancestral environment and cur-
rent conditions in the industrialized nations. In the 
modern environment shown below the dashed line, 
the same neural reward system is active but many 
novel foods and technologies exploit it, as shown 
by the arrow on the left. This is a clear example of 
social change outpacing genetic change (adapted 
from Crawford, 1993).
I.8 Concluding Remarks on ET
 ET is a theoretical approach that 
consists of using Darwin’s theories of 
natural and sexual selection to explain 
human behavior and cognition. ET uses 
adaptationism as a heuristic to create hy-
potheses about the purpose or function of 
specific adaptations. Importantly, ETs re-
alize that not all adaptations are currently 
adaptive. This research program has 
ramifications for all disciplines because 
humans, whatever else they might be, are 
the end products of millions of years of 
natural and sexual selection. Due to this 
fact, Wilson (1998) advocates the unity 
of all branches of human study and calls 
this process ET is a theoretical approach 
that consists of using Darwin’s theories 
of natural and sexual selection to explain 
human behavior and cognition. ET uses 
adaptationism as a heuristic to create hy-
potheses about the purpose or function of 
specific adaptations. Importantly, ETs re-
alize that not all adaptations are currently 
adaptive. This research program has 
ramifications for all disciplines because 
humans, whatever else they might be, 
are the end products of millions of years 
of natural and sexual selection. Due to 
this fact, Wilson (1998) advocates the 
unity of all branches of human study and 
calls this process consilience. ET offers 
promise that this ambitious goal can be 
fulfilled (see table 1) (Alcock, 2001). 
Ancestral Selection Pressures Procuring and consuming necessarynutrients
Neural reward systems for seeking
and consuming sugars, salts, and fats
Hunting animals, foraging for ripe
fruits, and consuming the food
products
Neural reward systems for seeking
and consuming sugars, salts and fats
Shopping at stores for foods such as
ice cream, potato chips, etc. Getting
fast food, and eating out
Adaptation
EEA Behavioral Response
Adaptation
Modern Behavioral Response(s)
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Table 1. Some Repr esentative Interdisciplinary Works fr om ETs
Author(s)
Thayer, 2000 International Relations
Barash & Barash, 2005
Gottschall & Wilson, 2005
Browne, 2002
Jones & Goldsmith, 2005
Johnson, 2004
Gat, 2006
Gottschall, 2008
Alford and Hibbing, 2004
Alford, Funk, & Hibbing, 2005
Carmen, 2007
Boyer, 2001
Atran,  2002
Wilson, 2002
Kirkpatrick, 2005
Boyer & Bergstrom, 2008
Betzig, 1986
Betzig, 1992
Diamond, 1999
Betzig, 2005
De Waal, 1996
Hauser, 2006
Haidt, 2007
Haidt, 2008
Hart, 2007
Literary Criticism
Law
Religion
History
Morality/Ethics
Warfare
Political Attitudes/Behavior
Subject
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II Attacks on Evolutionary Theory
 It is perhaps worthwhile to examine 
the historical reasons for the develop-
ment of an anti-evolutionary mindset in 
the social sciences. Many early psycholo-
gists and social theorists such as Marx, 
Freud, Galton, Spencer, James, Shaw, 
Dewey, Cooley, and Thorndike enthu-
siastically embraced Darwinism and 
attempted to use the principles of evolu-
tion to sharpen their analyses (Jones, 
1980; Degler, 1991). During this period, 
eugenics was as likely to be embraced by 
left-wing reformers as by right-wing tra-
ditionalists (Kelves, 1985). However, the 
enthusiasm of left-wing thinkers began 
to wane in the early twentieth century. In 
anthropology, Franz Boaz, Ruth Bene-
dict, and Margaret Mead all wrote influ-
ential books that assailed the idea of bio-
logical universals and ushered in a form 
of environmental determinism (Richards, 
1987). In psychology, a parallel process 
occurred, with John Watson leading 
the environmentalists’ cause (Plotkin, 
2004). At this point, ET was almost 
exclusively a right-wing style of think-
ing as most of the left were won over by 
theories of environmental determinism. 
In fact, the ideas of ET and some form of 
exploitative social order became nearly 
synonymous, as illustrated by Richard 
Hofstader’s (1942/1992) warning in the 
early 1940s that “a resurgence of social 
Darwinism in either its individualist or 
imperialist uses is always a possibility 
so long as there is a strong element of 
predacity in society” (p. 203). Opposition 
to Nazism seemed to bury ET, as many 
saw Nazism as the inevitable outgrowth 
of biologically oriented theories of social 
behavior.
 For about twenty years after the end 
of World War II, environmentalism so 
thoroughly dominated popular thought 
that most intellectuals accepted it without 
reflection. The major exceptions to this 
trend were psychologists influenced 
by the burgeoning cognitive revolu-
tion (Chomsky, 1959; Neisser, 1967). 
In this milieu, E.O. Wilson (1975/2000) 
published Sociobiology, which became 
the centerpiece of a new debate about the 
legitimacy of applying ET to analyses 
of human social behavior (Segraståle, 
2000). This time, the social sciences 
were nearly unified in their disdain for 
and rejection of ET.
 This unification, however, was not 
equal across disciplines. Because 
psychology had already integrated the 
nativism of the cognitive revolution, and 
because it had a tradition of respecting 
and profiting from biologically oriented 
thought (e.g., physiology, psychiatry), it 
was more accepting of modern ET than 
the other human sciences (Benjafield, 
2005; Hunt, 2007). On the other end of 
the spectrum, sociology was and contin-
ues to be strongly opposed to integrat-
ing ET into its research program. Ellis 
(1977), van den Berghe (1990), and 
Massey (2002) offer several reasons for 
this. First, many sociologists lack bio-
logical competence. Second, sociology 
has a history of antireductionist thought; 
therefore, many sociologists argue that 
the reductionistic strategy of biology is 
irrelevant for explaining higher-order 
social phenomena. Third, sociology is 
an overtly moralistic discipline: Many 
sociologists show as much concern for a 
theory’s political significance as they do 
for its explanatory power (Lopreato & 
Crippen, 1999). 
III General Purpose and Logic of Our 
Study
 We were interested in discerning the 
reasons for the perpetuation of hostile 
attitudes toward ET. We assumed that 
erroneous information was a key factor, 
as well as exposure to authorities who 
denigrated ET. Given these assump-
tions, textbooks were a logical source 
to examine. A literature review revealed 
two previous studies relevant to our goal. 
Cornwell, Palmer, Guinther, and Davis 
(2005) investigated 262 introductory 
psychology textbooks over a 30-year 
span beginning in 1975. They found that 
48 percent of the textbooks presented ET 
in an accurate manner (tabulated from 
figure 2), while 57 percent presented it 
in a positive or neutral manner (tabulated 
from figure 3). In another study, Martin 
and Machalek (2006) investigated 35 of 
the top-selling introductory sociology 
textbooks. Of the sample, 69 percent of 
the books covered ET. A content analysis 
revealed that many egregious errors were 
made in their presentations of ET. Pre-
dominate among the errors were charges 
of genetic determinism and biological 
reductionism.
 Our study expands upon these two 
studies in important ways. First, we de-
veloped a general model to explain and 
make testable predictions about the per-
petuation of errors and hostility toward 
ET (see figures 3 and 4 below).  Second, 
we quantified specific types of errors and 
marked their occurrence in the text-
books we analyzed. Third, we compared 
textbooks from separate disciplines, 
psychology and sociology. These features 
of our analysis will help social scientists 
assess the accuracy of textbooks across 
disciplines. They also facilitate dialogue 
about possible ways to solve the prob-
lems that arise from the transmission of 
distorted information about ET.  
 For several reasons, we chose to focus 
on sex/gender textbooks. First, previ-
ous exposure had convinced us that sex/
gender textbooks are especially liable to 
make erroneous claims about ET. Sec-
ond, the history of ET led us to believe 
that politically charged subjects, such as 
race and sex/gender, are more likely to 
be presented in a normative framework 
which distorts science (e.g., Fausto-
Sterling, 1992; Hubbard, 1997; Rushton 
& Jensen, 2005). Third, ET provides a 
powerful framework for generating novel 
theories about sex differences. ETs have 
used these theories to create and test a 
wide variety of interesting predictions 
about sex differences in cognition and 
behavior (e.g., Geary, 1998; Kimura, 
1999; Halpern, 2000; Buss, 2003). Thus, 
it is important that sex/gender research-
ers and students become acquainted with 
accurate presentations of ET. 
IV Hypothesis and Predictions
 Below, we develop a general model to 
explain the continuing ignorance of and 
hostility toward ET in the social sci-
ences. Specifically, we suggest that there 
is a self-perpetuating cycle, led by social 
science faculty, which results in the 
transmission of biased information about 
the basic tenets of ET (figures 3 and 4). 
Our model can be broken down into a 
few basic components.
IV. 1. Antecedent Factors
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 Social science professors’ attitudes 
toward various theoretical perspectives 
do not develop in a vacuum. We posit 
four general factors which influence 
knowledge of and attitude toward ET. 1) 
Biological Illiteracy: Since biology is not 
a regular part of the curriculum of the so-
cial sciences, many professors are func-
tionally illiterate about the basic tenets 
of ET. 2) Historical Contingency: The 
historical trajectory in many of the social 
sciences has moved toward environmen-
talist explanations of social behavior and 
away from biological or genetic explana-
tions (Degler, 1991; Lopreato & Crippen, 
1999). 3) Anti-Reductionism: As noted 
above, many social scientists, especially 
in sociology, distrust reductionism in 
science, believing that social phenom-
ena must be explained by social factors 
(Durkheim, 1895/1982). Thus, the search 
for the biological underpinnings of social 
behavior appears fruitless or even dan-
gerously misguided. 4) Moral/Political 
Factors: Many of the social sciences are 
populated by scholars who see theory as 
a tool to fight for social justice (Sowell, 
1987; Lipset, 1994). This, combined with 
skepticism about the possibility of scien-
tific objectivity, has led to suspicion of 
ET and consequently its lack of use as a 
major theoretical perspective (see section 
II) (Sanderson & Ellis, 1992).
IV. 2. Faculty and Textbook Selection
 The antecedent factors listed above 
give rise to faculty members who display 
negative attitudes toward ET. These 
faculty members are likely to select text-
books which reflect their own ideological 
positions; thus textbooks which contain 
accurate, non-hostile summaries of ET 
are unlikely to be used in social science 
classrooms. Previous studies of textbooks 
suggest this is indeed the case (Cornwell 
et al., 2005; Martin & Machalek, 2006). 
It is important to emphasize that most 
social science professors probably select 
textbooks based on their popularity and/
or general ideological orientation, rather 
than what the textbooks explicitly say 
about ET. However, due to the general 
ideological predilections of many social 
scientists, this selection process auto-
matically eliminates the textbooks which 
portray ET in a positive manner. For ex-
ample, a textbook written from a Marxist 
or symbolic interactionist perspective 
is unlikely to present ET and, if it does, 
unlikely to present it accurately.
IV. 3. Students
 We do not assume that students come 
into the social sciences with negative 
attitudes or intrinsic antipathy toward 
ET. In fact, it seems probable that most 
social science students lack knowledge 
of biology, or, at most, have nominal 
biological literacy (Uno & Bybee, 1994; 
Wright & Klymkowsky, 2005). This lack 
of knowledge makes undergraduate text-
books extremely powerful tools for the 
pedagogical transmission of information 
about ET. If most textbooks are hostile 
and/or inaccurate, then students will 
more than likely misunderstand ET and 
harbor hostility toward it. Most of these 
students will leave academia, but a few, 
who have absorbed the dogmas of their 
discipline, will continue on to become 
researchers and teachers.
IV. 4. A Cycle of Hostility
 The components of our model de-
scribed above create a cycle of hostility 
toward ET: Faculty who are hostile select 
more hostile and less accurate textbooks 
and assign them to students who, in turn, 
become hostile. Some of these students 
become professors who then perpetuate 
erroneous views of ET by selecting simi-
larly inaccurate and hostile textbooks. 
 Four testable predictions can be de-
rived from this model (Figures 3 and 4): 
(P1) Sex/gender textbooks will system-
atically misrepresent ET as measured 
by number of types of errors made and 
attitude; (P2) Sex/gender textbooks with 
higher levels of hostility will make more 
types of errors when discussing ET; 
(P3) Sex/gender textbooks that are more 
popular will make more types of errors 
when discussing ET than less popular 
textbooks; (P4) Sociology sex/gender 
textbooks will contain more types of er-
rors and display more hostility than will 
psychology sex/gender textbooks (see 
section II for background).
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V Materials and Methods
V. 1. Textbook Selection
 We began identifying social science 
textbooks focusing on sex and/or gender 
by contacting Monument Informa-
tion Resource (MIR), a company that 
compiles information on undergraduate 
textbook usage in the United States. MIR 
provided us with separate databases for 
all psychology and sociology courses 
taught in the fall of 2007 with titles 
similar to "Sex and Gender," "Women's 
Studies," and "Human Sexuality." For 
each course, information was provided 
on the institution where the course was 
taught, the course title, the instructor, the 
expected enrollment, and any required or 
recommended books. For both psy-
chology and sociology databases, we 
sorted the books by title and used online 
resources, such as reviews and pub-
lisher's descriptions, to initially identify 
introductory textbooks to sex and gender 
that were broad in scope, including 
discussions of both social and biological 
factors that influence gender-differen-
tiated behavior. We excluded textbooks 
published prior to 1995, edited volumes, 
encyclopedias, readers or article com-
pilations, specialized academic books 
(e.g., those on sexual violence, human 
sexuality, gender and aging, gender and 
religiosity, gender and math, gender and 
labor markets, gender and group pro-
cesses), and non-academic books (e.g., 
those marketed toward parents or lay 
audiences). In cases where it was unclear 
if a book was appropriate, we obtained 
it and collectively made a judgment. We 
selected the nine most popular psychol-
ogy textbooks and the six most popular 
sociology textbooks. Future studies will 
examine books that are less widely used.
 We obtained rankings of each text-
book's popularity by summing the stu-
dent enrollment in all courses where the 
textbook was required or recommended 
in the 2007 academic year. For the 
textbooks used in our sample, the mean 
expected student usage per semester was 
2,990; the median was 2,180 (see Appen-
dix A for the list of textbooks included in 
the sample). After obtaining the text-
books, we began the coding process.
V. 2. Procedure for Coding Texts
 In order to find the pages in the text-
books that covered ET and code them, 
we developed a list of six key words 
(evolution, Darwin, natural selection, 
sexual selection, biology, evolutionary 
psychology, and sociobiology) and used 
the index to sum the number of pages 
mentioning these terms. These sections 
of the text were analyzed and coded; all 
other pages were excluded.
V. 3. Procedure for Coding Errors
 We made a list of seven common and 
egregious errors that social scientists are 
suspected of making when discussing 
ET. The list was compiled by consult-
ing popular evolutionary psychology 
textbooks. In these textbooks, readers are 
clearly told to avoid the errors that we 
compiled (Cartwright, 2000; Bridgeman, 
2003; Buss, 2008). 
V. 4. The Coded Errors
 Below is a list of the seven errors we 
coded and an explanation and example of 
them. Note that biological determinism, 
naturalistic fallacy, and intentionalistic 
fallacy are errors wrongly attributed to 
ET, while mechanical demonstration, 
moralistic fallacy, conservative agenda, 
and ad hominem are errors or fallacies 
used to argue against ET. Some specific 
textbook examples are provided in Ap-
pendix A.
1. Biological Determinism. The asser-
tion that biology can explain all social 
behavior and that humans are entirely 
determined by biological forces. For 
example, the claim that war is inevitable 
because it is hardwired.  
2. Naturalistic Fallacy. The assertion 
that what exists is either somehow good 
or right simply because it exists. For 
example, the claim that inequality is 
justified because it currently exists and 
has existed for many years.
3. Mechanical Demonstration. The as-
sertion that if a scholar lacks knowledge 
of the specific proximate mechanism for 
a behavior, then that scholar is unable to 
legitimately make any claims about the 
evolutionary function of the behavior. 
For example, the claim that we cannot 
reasonably discuss the evolutionary func-
tion of human food preferences because 
we do not have knowledge of the specific 
physiological pathways involved. 
4. Moralistic Fallacy. The assertion that 
what is deemed good must be able to ex-
ist and that any theory that circumscribes 
its possibility cannot be true. For exam-
ple, the claim that there are no sex/gen-
der differences because such differences 
are judged undesirable and are thought to 
have negative political ramifications.
5. Conservative Agenda. The asser-
tion that ETs have a conservative and/
or right-wing political agenda and that 
this agenda significantly influences their 
research. For example, the claim that 
scholars should ignore ETs because their 
work is used or has been used to justify 
the status quo, and that the ETs them-
selves either openly or secretly favor 
this.
6. Ad Hominem. An attack aimed at 
a person rather than an argument. For 
example, the claim that people should 
ignore the work of scholar X because he 
hates women. 
7. Intentionalistic Fallacy. The assertion 
that humans intentionally and conscious-
ly attempt to enhance their inclusive 
fitness. For example, the claim that the 
existence and usage of contraceptives 
disproves ET’s account of the evolution 
of sexual motivation. 
 When coding the textbooks for errors, 
we accepted a statement as fitting one of 
the seven only if it was explicit. Where 
there was ambiguity we erred on the side 
of not coding the passage as an error.
V. 5. Attitude Ranking
 We coded the attitude of the textbooks 
on a 5-point Likert scale with 1 being 
extremely hostile and 5 extremely posi-
tive. Here we used the general tone of the 
text. Importantly, we understood attitude 
and accuracy to be independent con-
structs with no a priori relationship. For  
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example, consider the following passage:
 
 Thus males are hardwired geneti- 
 cally to be promiscuous sexual preda- 
 tors, ever on the prowl for new poten- 
 tial sexual conquests, whereas females  
 have a built-in biological tendency  
 toward monogamy, fantasies of   
 romantic love and commitment cou- 
 pled with sexual behavior, and a cer- 
 tain sexual reticence that can be over 
 come only by chivalric male promises  
 of fealty and fidelity. (Kimmel, 2008,  
 p. 24)
Regardless of whether or not it is an ac-
curate presentation, the hostile rhetoric 
would receive a one on the attitude scale. 
On the other hand, the next passage, 
although inaccurate, is not written in a 
hostile tone and would receive a neutral 
(three) score:
 The theory [sociobiology] implies  
 that such human social behaviors as  
 war, rape, and racism have been "built  
 in" through our evolution and that it is  
 impossible to make fundamental  
 changes in the relations between   
 the sexes. (Lips, 2005, p. 77)
When giving a final score for each 
textbook, we averaged over the entire 
section as identified by our search crite-
ria. Therefore, one or two passages were 
not given undue consideration and were 
treated equally with all other passages in 
the section. 
V. 6. Coder Reliability
 We used two coders, one of whom 
coded seven textbooks while the other 
coded ten. Two textbooks were coded 
independently to check for reliability. 
Coding of the two texts was identical for 
errors and the correlation for attitude rat-
ings was very high.
Fig. 5. The number of types of errors in a textbook is listed on the 
x-axis, while the number of books is listed on the y-axis.
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 We began our analysis by tabulating 
the number of types of errors made in 
each textbook and ranking their attitude 
toward ET (P1). As predicted, most of 
the textbooks made multiple types of 
errors (see figure 5). Of our sample, only 
three made no types of errors, while 
twelve made two or more, and one made 
all seven of the coded types of errors 
(M = 2.8, Med = 3, SD = 1.97). Most of 
the textbooks also displayed a hostile 
attitude toward ET (M = 1.87, SD = .64). 
Four textbooks displayed extremely 
hostile attitudes, while the most favor-
able attitude displayed was neutral and 
occurred in three textbooks (see section 
V.5).  
 We then examined each of our re-
maining predictions. As predicted (P2), 
textbooks with higher hostility rankings 
(lower score on the attitude scale) made 
more errors (rs = - .59, p = .018). This 
relationship was statistically significant. 
Also as predicted (P3), textbooks with 
higher student usage made more errors 
(See figure 6) (rs = - .42, p = .11). This 
relationship was not quite significant.
 Finally, as predicted (P4), sociology 
textbooks averaged more types of errors 
(see figures 7 and 8) (sociology: M = 
3.83, SD 1.94; psychology: M = 2.11, 
SD = 1.76). Specifically, more sociology 
books contained types of errors 1, 2, 4, 
5, and 6 (see table 2). A large disparity is 
shown for types of errors 2, 4, and 5, as 
expected from our historical analysis of 
sociology’s relationship with ET. Sociol-
ogy textbooks also showed higher levels 
of hostility (M = 1.5) than psychology 
textbooks (M = 2.1).   
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!Fig. 7. The specific error is listed on the x-axis, 
while the percentage of books making the error 
is on the y-axis. The textbooks are split between 
sociology and psychology for comparison.
Fig. 8. Comparison of the mean number of 
errors made by sociology and psychology 
textbooks.
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VII Specific Discussion
 ET provides a powerful metatheory for 
the social sciences because of its unique 
ability to explain many components of 
human cognition and behavior. We be-
lieve that much of the current resistance 
to ET stems from misunderstandings 
rather than willful negligence and distor-
tion. In this study, we developed a model 
to explain this phenomenon, hoping that 
knowledge of its causes might help stop 
its perpetuation. Consistent with Corn-
well et al. (2005) and Machalek and Mar-
tin (2006), we found that textbook repre-
sentations of ET were hostile and full of 
various types of errors. Importantly, we 
found both that more popular textbooks 
make more types of errors and that more 
hostile textbooks make more types of er-
rors. This provides strong support for our 
general model and also for our belief that 
hostility toward ET is based primarily 
on misunderstanding rather than willful 
distortion. 
 Our model can also clarify the types 
of errors expected to occur in different 
disciplines, as shown by our results. For 
example, the types of errors made by 
sociology textbooks are not random, but 
rather related to certain ideological pre-
dilections. Moral/political factors play a 
large role in sociology and the errors that 
sociology textbooks made are clustered 
around these concerns (see figure 7). In-
terestingly, the types of errors made more 
by psychology textbooks are related to 
specific concerns expected from psy-
chologists, including empirical rigor and 
attention to proximate (psychological) 
behavioral mechanisms. This suggests 
that ETs should address discipline-
specific concerns in an effort to facilitate 
understanding. It also suggests that our 
model could be refined by adding more 
antecedent factors.
 In future research, we plan to improve 
our attitude rankings by having under-
graduate students, blind to our hypoth-
eses, read and code appropriate textbook 
passages. We also plan to study the 
long-term effects of exposure to different 
textbooks. For example, does the incom-
ing sociology student have a more favor-
able attitude toward ET than a graduating 
sociology student? Does this process 
intensify in graduate school? And if it 
does, are the causes the same? Another 
interesting question is whether the distor-
tions of ET are tracable to only a few 
scholarly sources or whether they are 
widely dispersed. Cornwell et al. (2005) 
began this process by looking at which 
scholars were cited in the ET sections of 
introductory psychology textbooks. They 
found a few scholars had undue influ-
ence, and we suspect that the same is true 
in most textbooks.
VIII General Discussion      
 Denis Diderot, an Enlightenment 
philosopher, explained that “all things 
must be examined, debated, investigated 
without exception and without regard for 
anyone’s feelings” (Diderot, 2008).  His 
sentiment nicely summarizes the spirit 
of scientific inquiry, a spirit most people 
consider vital for political, intellectual, 
and personal development. Yet, as our 
results show, this spirit has been thwarted 
in the most important area of all: the 
social sciences. Regardless of political 
interests or ideological commitments, 
few would argue that this should be 
applauded. What is worse, ET is not an 
abstract theory of interest to academics 
alone; it has ramifications that touch as-
pects of everyone’s lives (Wilson, 2007). 
Without lucid, error-free presentations of 
ET, thousands of students are introduced 
to a distorted caricature and are unable 
to accurately and independently assess 
the value of ET. Even those who most 
oppose ET should lament this because 
it curdles conversation and disallows 
legitimate argument. The best way to 
discover the shortcomings of a theory 
is to allow as many scholars as possible 
a fair chance to scrutinize it. Science at 
its best is a truly communal undertak-
ing; theories are erected and refined by 
myriad people and should be blind to 
individual concerns or prejudices. The 
integrity of this undertaking is damaged 
when biases are allowed to seep in that 
affect the presentation of scientific infor-
mation. Finally, it is important to iterate 
that science itself is neutral about what 
ought to be done in the world. Science 
can only inform us about the way things 
are.      
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List of Evolutionary Psychology Textbooks Used
Badcock, C. (2000). Evolutionary psychology: A critical introduction. Malden, MA: Polity.
Barrett, L., Dunbar, R., & Lycett, J. (2002). Human evolutionary psychology. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.
Bridgeman, B. (2003). Psychology & evolution: The origins of mind. Thousand Oaks, CA: Sage.
Buss, D. M. (2008). Evolutionary psychology: The new science of the mind (3rd ed.). Boston: Pearson.
Cartwright, J. (2000). Evolution and human behavior: Darwinian perspectives on human nature. Cambridge, MA: Bradford.
Gaulin, S. J. C., & McBurney, D. H. (2004). Evolutionary psychology. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Pearson.
Palmer, J. A., & Palmer, L. K. (2002). Evolutionary psychology: The ultimate origins of human behavior. Boston: Pearson.
Rossano, M. J. (2003). Evolutionary psychology: The science of human behavior and evolution. Danvers, MA: John Wiley.
Workman, L., & Reader, W. (2004). Evolutionary psychology: An introduction. Cambridge, MA: Cambridge University Press.
List of 15 Most Popular Textbooks on Sex/Gender 
(Data Calculated from MIR)
Anderson, M. (2006). Thinking about women: Sociological perspectives on sex and gender (7th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Branon, L. (2007). Gender: Psychological perspectives (5th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Caplan, P. J., & Caplan, J. B. (1999). Thinking critically about research on sex and gender. Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Connell, R. W. (2002). Gender. Malden, MA: Polity.
Crawford, M., & Unger, R. K. (2004). Women and gender: A feminist psychology (4th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Hegelson, V. S. (2005). The psychology of gender (2nd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Hyde, J. S. (2007). Half the human experience: The psychology of women (7th ed.). Boston: Houghton Mifflin.
Johnson, A. G. (2005). Gender knot: Unraveling our patriarchical legacy (2nd ed.). Philadelphia: Temple University Press.
Kimmel, M. S. (2008). The gendered society (3rd ed.). New York: Oxford University Press.
Lindsey, L. (1997). Gender roles: A sociological perspective (3rd ed.). Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall.
Lips, H. M. (2005). A new psychology of women: Gender, culture, and ethnicity (3rd ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Lips, H. M. (2008). Sex & gender: An introduction (6th ed.). Boston: McGraw-Hill.
Renzetti, C. M., & Curran, D. J. (2003). Women, men, and society (5th ed.). Boston: Allyn and Bacon.
Rider, E. A. (2005). Our voices: Psychology of women (2nd ed.). Hoboken, NJ: Wiley.
Smith, B. (2007). The psychology of sex and gender. Boston: Pearson.
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